An August 26 article in
the New York Times discussed the controversy throughout
the country of the use of DNA evidence to possibly exonerate
individuals of crimes. The article notes that 130 individuals
previously convicted have left prison based on DNA testing which
occurred after their convictions at trial. (And we know that
many of this group had been on death row.) The second paragraph
of the article identifies the substance of the controversy:
Prosecutors acknowledge that DNA testing
is reliable, but they have grown increasingly skeptical of its
power to prove innocence in cases where there was other evidence
of guilt. Defense lawyers say these prosecutors, who often relied
on the same biological evidence to convict the defendants before
DNA testing was available, are more committed to winning than
to justice.
As we consider this issue, we must be reminded
that investigatory technique -- particularly in the area of criminal
investigations -- is quite sensitive to improvements based on
research and technology. For example, research has helped to
establish that the traditional "line-up" that we have
seen conducted on television "cop" shows for decades
is not the most reliable method to ID a perpetrator. Researchers
working in laboratories have noted that when a group of five
or so individuals are part of a line-up, the real "criminal"
is more likely misidentified than if each person is presented
to the witness one at a time. Therefore, law enforcement authorities
better serve the truth when they use this more recent technique
than the one with which we are most familiar.
DNA testing is another area where research
and technology have lapped existing practice. Two decades ago
using DNA testing to identify physical evidence that could reliably
identify the origins of human tissue and fluids did not exist.
The police would rely primarily on a victim's or other witness's
testimonial evidence to establish identity, or on more primitive
forms of forensic evaluation (e.g., matching visible properties
of hair; blood typing).
There is an interesting difference between
the line-up research and the modern DNA tests. Even though we
will acknowledge that a different line-up procedure is now more
reliable, we cannot go back and redo the line-up in the original
case. We accept that there might be a better procedure now, but
we continue to accept even the more reduced reliability of the
previous procedure as the then best solution to the problem
of identification. By contrast, human genetic material can be
tested in a post-trial setting to determine if the jury "got
it right." In some cases the testing occurs for the very
first time. In others, it might be a retest with a new, more
reliable test.
So why would prosecutors resist post-trial
testing? The article explores several possible reasons. At one
point the author writes:
While prosecutors concede that DNA can
prove whether someone is associated with a given piece of biological
evidence, they insist that is not the same thing as proving whether
a defendant committed a crime.
In the cases of (two Florida inmates),
for example, the prosecutors say that the remaining evidence
in those cases was strong enough to uphold the men's convictions.
This argument is likely most persuasive
when the genetic material tested is taken from a location which
is not central to the location of the incident itself. For example,
it was in the same room as the victim, but not on the victim.
The Florida cases to which the article refers both involve rape.
In one the relevant genetic material was found on the woman's
bed sheets, and the second on the body of the 11 year old victim.
Neither location is so remote from the actual crime as to render
a subsequent DNA test irrelevant to deciding whether the jury
"got it right."
We're left with the possibility that the
prosecutors are married to the jury verdict out of pride. Winning
a case is the measure of a prosecutor's success. The trial's
result is a reflection of the prosecutor's competence. Now if
the case is lost due to incompetent prosecution, then such an
assessment is appropriate. But if the case is ultimately won
because a prosecutor successfully prevents relevant evidence
from emerging, then none of us should approve of that outcome.
Perhaps the most important reflection we
can make on a controversy is that the investigative process ought
not be the prisoner of an existing decision. If the purpose of
the investigation is to learn the truth, then the investigator
and those around him or her, must never isolate themselves from
new information. In other words, they must remain perpetually
objective, even where the previous evidence appeared to justify
a conclusion. To reopen a case as a consequence of new or better
information that might justify a different conclusion ought be
a measure of excellence, not failure.
New York Times citation:
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/29/national/29DNA.html?
ex=1063142490&ei=1&en=869d678eddea8b61